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‘Nature’, ‘law’, ‘humanity’ — the
rise of Positivism, with reference
to Quesnay, Turgot and Comte
Summary
The positivist expansion of the metaphorical conception of (natural) law over all as-
pects of human life (ending in technicism) dialectically denies the supposedly auto-
nomous rational control of humankind (modernity, Kant, Marx). The two meanings
of natural law — the moral and the physical — were unified by the physiocrat
Quesnay in a single formula stressing both the advantage of humankind and huma-
nity’s dependence upon the subhuman environment. Another physiocrat, Turgot,
understood human history in terms of inevitable laws of progress, and stressed the
fundamental role of natural necessity in human social formations. Auguste Comte,
attempting, like Quesnay, to unify the moral and the physical, completed the natu-
ral science approach to human life, which forced him to find a natural divinity in
Humanity in order to give meaning to human life, but the course towards
naturalism had already been set.
‘Natuur’, ‘wet’, ‘mensheid’ — die opkoms van die
Positiwisme met verwysing na Quesnay, Turgot en Comte
Die positiwistiese uitbreiding van die metaforiese konsepsie van ’n (natuur)wet wat alle
aspekte van die menslike lewe beheers, ontken dialekties die veronderstelde outonome
rasionele beheersing van die natuur deur die mens (moderniteit, Kant, Marx). Die twee
natuurwetopvattings — naamlik as ’n morele en as ’n fisiese wet — is deur die fisiokraat
Quesnay tot een formule verenig, waarin sowel die voordeel van ons mensheid as ons af-
hanklikheid van die benede-menslike omgewing beklemtoon is. ’n Ander fisiokraat,
Turgot, het die menslike geskiedenis verklaar in terme van die onvermydelike wette van
vooruitgang, en het die fundamentele rol van natuurnoodwendigheid in menslike same-
lewingsvorming beklemtoon. Auguste Comte het soos Quesnay gepoog om die morele
met die fisiese dimensie te verenig, en so die natuurwetenskaplike benadering tot die
menslike lewe afgerond, waardeur hy gedwing is om, ter wille van singewing aan die
menslike lewe, ’n natuurlike godheid, die Mensheid, te poneer. Die beweging na natu-
ralisme was egter teen hierdie tyd reeds gevestig.
Prof J J Venter, Dept of Philosophy, Potchefstroom University for C H E, Private Bag
X6001, Potchefstroom 2520; E-mail: filjjv@puknet.puk.ac.za
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Acareful study of a recent representative of positivist theory,such as Skinner’s behaviourism, presents us with the strangepicture of an apparent anti-humanism as the outcome of
humanism. In Beyond freedom and dignity, Skinner disposes of two
concepts relating to established human rights: freedom and dignity.
Asking questions about the background to this is no mere academic
exercise, since the right to human dignity, for example, is specifically
protected in the German and South African constitutions, as well as
in the UN Bill of Rights. Skinner subverts these concepts in the
name of a natural scientific approach to human behaviour — an
approach also found earlier in the works of psychologists such as
Freud and Watson, the linguist Bloomfield, and the physicist
Einstein (to name but a few), and which has a history reaching back
via early Positivism to early capitalist theory and to Descartes. Kurt
Bayertz (1996: 86) summarises the Skinnerian approach and its
consequences as follows:
Human subjectivity does not exist — and this is the true kernel of
Skinner’s theory — beyond Nature, but is part of it and resides with-
in it. By making its physical nature an object, the human being also
makes its subjectivity an object — and thus a part of Nature. The
strict difference between subjectivity and Nature, which forms the
basis for the concept of human dignity, disappears. Briefly: there is no
room within a scientific picture of humanity for the idea of human
dignity. In its scientific self-interpretation, the human being posi-
tions itself ‘beyond freedom and dignity’. [...] Nothing could be more
short-sighted at this point than the objection that this scientific pene-
tration and technological control only apply to the natural side of the
human being, not to its spiritual side and subjectivity. Hopes of sa-
ving the ‘inner’ human being with this kind of dualism have always
turned out to be naïve. The human spirit is very much part of this
world; it has a natural basis. The subject may not coincide with the
body, but neither can it be separated from it. Technological access to
the body will therefore not stop there: at some time or another, it will
also affect the subject and its spirit.
1. Relevance
The control of the world with the help of science has a long tradition
in modern thought — Descartes (1969: 49) believed that the study
of the laws of nature would “render ourselves lords and possessors of
nature”. One of the acute problems in this tradition was: what is to
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be included under “nature”? Or: what influence does “nature” have
over human life, especially rational thinking? Of course Descartes
elevated human subjectivity above that kind of nature which is stu-
died in the natural sciences, with the help of a strict opposition be-
tween thinking and extended substances. But as ontology became
progressively historicised (and naturalistic in some respects), these
questions became more acute. On the one hand it was maintained
that progress and the control of nature are the task of reason (which
somehow occupied an Archimedean point above nature) and, on the
other, that the ascendancy of reason to the throne of history was a
product of nature (cf Venter 1999a: 31-38). The adherents of the
tradition of scientism invested in the naturalist version of the new
ontology. Their clash with the ideas of “dignity” and “freedom” was
that these normative ideas imply that human beings are special and
frustrate the attempts of scientists to be also “lords and possessors” of
humankind.
According to Habermas (1987: 3-15) the (incomplete) project of
modernity has been the emancipation of humankind. At a deeper
level this emancipation has meant a horizontalising of ontology: the
ancient and medieval belief in the dependence of the world (and spe-
cifically humanity) on a “supernatural” power or a transcendent crea-
tor in whom the meaning and destination of life are concentrated was
gradually replaced by an ontology which is centred in humankind (cf
Venter 1999a: 21-38). This historicised ontology replaced the older
transcendent destination of humankind with a new one: progress in
using reason to control humankind’s subrational side and the natural
environment, and retro-projected the line of progress into a past,
purely “natural”, origin for humanity. This kind of ontology is ex-
pressed by thinkers like Rousseau, Turgot, Kant, Hegel, Comte and
Marx. Humankind is suspended between origin (dependence upon
“nature”) and “reason” (control of “nature”) — a new (determinist)
dependence for the emancipating human being. As Kant (1975b:
33), the supreme spokesman of human rational autonomy, says: the
freedom of the human will in the form of action is “determined by
the force of natural law, precisely like every other natural event”. And
behind the narrative of emancipation and progress — a utopian nar-
rative expecting world peace and a moral order — lurks a difficult
problem: human beings are killing, oppressing, defrauding, and en-
slaving one another: in other words the problem of “evil”. Evil is then
woven into history as a necessary mechanism of progress provided by
nature, and the rule of reason — as the new supreme good — is post-
poned so that nature can fulfil its purpose with humankind. This is
the legacy Turgot leaves to Kant.
The outcome of this tension is ironical. The autonomous human
subject was supposed to be in control of nature, by means of both
science and practical rationality. But Skinner and Bayertz deny pre-
cisely this autonomy with regard to nature: humankind is viewed as
controlled by its natural tendencies, governed by the laws of nature,
and therefore controllable by natural science and by technology based
on that science. “Nature” in this context is understood as primarily
those aspects of “reality” which are studied in the natural sciences (phy-
sics, chemistry, biology, the medical sciences and psychiatry). The con-
cepts of “law” and “nature” with special reference to human life are at
issue. How did this philosophically ironic situation of the inversion of
human autonomy and control of nature come about?
As early as the seventeenth century, capitalist economics consider-
ed the actions of the price mechanism as an inevitable law of nature
for human action. This approach made it difficult to formulate the
task of the state with regard to economic justice. Individual self-inte-
rest was believed to act in a necessitarian way and to be in itself ad-
vantageous to the state, while intervention by the state was consider-
ed futile and mischievous, by definition. Some social scientists, such
as Petty and Hobbes, understood the terms “nature” and “natural
law”, as used in the human sciences, from the mechanical perspective
of the natural sciences. As a consequence the normative leeway im-
plied in the medieval understanding of “natural law” as well as in
Locke’s doctrine of natural rights disappeared, and “natural law” ac-
quired the same inevitability in the social and human disciplines
which Descartes attributed to it with regard to extended bodies.1
“Law (of nature)” is a metaphor derived from human legislative
life. The full metaphor included that of the lawgiver (God). The idea
of God here is more than the abstract keystone which sustains the me-
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1 Cf further Ekelund & Hebert 1983: 39ff; Chalk 1951: 335ff.
taphoric arch. For Locke (in debate with Hobbes) the recognition of
the lawgiver is a presupposition for recognition of the real law character
of the law of nature (cf Laslett 1988: 80). Newton, although using the
Euclidean model for the structure of his Principia, set strict re-
quirements of empirical foundations in the study of the laws. His more
voluntarist idea of God allowed for changeability and therefore he
preferred a limited a posteriori approach (cf Van der Hoeven 1979: 90ff).
Descartes, on the other hand, was nearer to the intellectualist tradition
of scholastism, and founded his laws in the immutability of God, as
expressed in a priori axioms in human reason (cf for example Discourse on
method V, 1969: 33). This had the consequence that in Descartes the law
was considered absolute, even with regard to the lawgiver.
The perspective of law and the lawgiver has important implications
for human life. We have already noted that economic determinism
poses the question of justice. But more is at stake here. How should we
conceive of the relationship between the two “laws of nature” — the
Cartesian necessity of mechanical bodies and the Lockean natural law
of freedom? Quesnay, the eighteenth-century physiocratic economist,
tried to sustain both meanings and to inter-relate them — precisely by
means of the idea of the control of subhuman nature to the advantage
of humankind. Although he supported human freedom, the subhuman
was given a special status in the hierarchy of the two natures by defi-
ning the human ethic of natural law in terms of the subhuman process
of natural law, which had already been defined in terms of control.
Physiocratic economics accentuated the dependency of humankind on
subhuman nature, and simultaneously continued the mercantilist in-
sistence on market freedom as inevitable natural law. Vis-à-vis the “su-
pernatural” in the Catholic tradition, Quesnay stressed the role of “na-
ture” in both senses, but tended to define the one in terms of the other,
such that ethics was adjusted to the physical advantages of humankind.
He still understood “evil” in terms of individual responsibility as the
bad use of freedom.
Turgot, who shared the principles of physiocracy with Quesnay,
went further along these lines, developing them into a doctrine of
progress. He still distinguished between the linearity of human his-
tory and the cyclical necessity of nature, but considered the law of
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The “lawgiver” and governor of the universe (of Descartes, Newton,
and Locke) thus disappeared behind autonomous human progress
(the historicising of ontology), and along with it the sense of endu-
ring transgression of the “laws”. Progress away from all evil had to
occur by some necessity in humankind itself. Turgot understands
progress in terms of three necessary phases of intellectual maturation,
ending in a rational situation of peace and justice. He anticipated
Kant, Adam Smith, Marx and the social Darwinists in understanding
the evil which human beings perpetrate against one another as a ne-
cessary mechanism of progress. In fact the Hobbesian idea of human
nature (the war of all against all) becomes the way in which human-
kind moves to its rational utopian destiny. And the physiocratic sen-
sitivity for human dependence on physical nature becomes the only
determining factor for the structure of society and relations among
human beings. Thus the tendency in Adam Smith and Marx to ex-
plain a mental, cultural superstructure in terms of a material base
finds its origin in Turgot. The explanatory value of the natural envi-
ronment (for eventual good or temporary evil) became stronger, and
Turgot accentuated this by proposing mathematical language as the
only real scientific language.
Auguste Comte, who inherited Turgot’s law of the three phases,
completed the natural science approach to humankind in his early
works. But as a mature thinker, he found that in such an approach
life loses its meaning, and intellectuals remain stuck in the details of
the natural (physical) sciences. Quesnay’s definition of physical law in
terms of advantages for humankind seems to lose its validity. The au-
tomatic destination given by nature (in Turgot and Kant) has no sig-
nificance for moral action — humankind is delivered over to its base,
egotistic instincts, with no neutralising factor. Thus (as opposed to
the “supernatural” divinity), Comte introduced a “natural” divinity,
“Humanity”, as source of inspiration in a humanistic religion, and
attempted to re-open the way to a dualist view of the relationship
between body and soul. His mature arguments for the irreducibility
of different law spheres distinguished by virtue of this dualism
represent an attempt to neutralise the consequences of his insistence
on the singular dependency of humankind upon its environment.
With the help of the religion of humanity, he tried to open human
culture to love but, remaining in historical ontology, he found no
escape from the determinist claws of scientism with its physical
necessities. The combination of scientism and collectivism under the
influence of Comte is analysed in depth by Von Hayek (1952). Comte
does, however, temper rationalism in two ways. On the one hand he
tries to allocate some leadership to the “heart” (sentiments), and on
the other he moves in the direction of pragmatism by allowing
practical needs to determine the direction of natural science.
Positivism did not appear overnight. It is the product of a long
struggle by modern humanity to take the future completely into its
own hands, believing in its own ability to structure nature according
to its own plans, while struggling with the fact that it is itself part of
that nature. Finally, the human being is becoming the object of plan-
ning expertise, even after the collapse of the claims of reason. The vex-
ing question now is: who controls the controllers in a society where
managerialism — a recent form of technicism — is fast replacing
both political despotism and democratic decision-making?
2. Quesnay (1694-1774) — natural rights and the 
two types of natural law
Quesnay2 finds himself in the pre-revolutionary French Enlighten-
ment, participating in the broader philosophical discussion about
human rights and, in the aftermath of mercantilism, trying to defend
the freedom of the market on the basis of divinely given “natural
law”. Natural rights are founded in “natural law”, and he argues that
natural law (in both a physical and a moral sense) refers to the regu-
larities concerning the advantages to humankind inherent in the use
of the physical cosmos, on which humankind depends. He follows
the age-old idea that “natural law” is accessible to reason by way of
evidence, but that reason needs the enlightenment of education in or-
der to live a really human (dignified) life according to this basic law.
We need to approach Quesnay’s use of “natural law” in the context of
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2 Francois Quesnay studied medicine and was a doctor at the French court. He
developed the economic theory of physiocracy (literally “nature rules”), and had
a considerable following for some time. Physiocratic economics denied creati-
vity to any economic sector except agriculture, and its influence soon faded.
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the contrast between the natural and the supernatural as well as in
the more specific context of his idea of natural rights. Quesnay recog-
nises a supernatural order (as if not to alienate the Catholic society in
which he was working), but his focus is secular. His analysis is limit-
ed to the natural order, which he understands in terms of natural law.
His cross-definition of physical natural law and moral natural law in
terms of each other seems dialectical.
2.1 Natural rights
Quesnay attempts to reconcile the contradictory viewpoints of the phi-
losophers of his time concerning natural rights. He defines a natural
right “vaguely” as “the right which a human being has to things pro-
per to his/her enjoyment” (Quesnay 1965a: 359). Natural rights are
those rights which nature has assigned to us, for example, the right to
light which all human beings have to whom nature has given eyes: to
deny this to any of them would be violating the order established by
the supreme intelligence (Quesnay 1965b: 754). He also circumscribes
natural rights as the “natural principle of all the duties of man regula-
ted by reason” (Quesnay 1965a: 364). Babies, even though they lack
intelligence and bodily strength, have a natural right to subsistence
from their parents — a parental duty supported by the even stronger
power of affection. This duty falls into the area of justice, since parents
owe their children what they received from their own parents. Justice
constitutes a rational obligation, defined as “a natural and sovereign
rule, recognised by the light of reason, which determines evidently
that which is due to oneself or to another” (Quesnay 1965a: 365).
Natural right is distinguished from legal right precisely in that
the former is known by reason by way of evidence and constitutes
without any constraint an obligation through this evidence alone,
while legal rights are limited by positive law, obligatory through the
sanction of law, and known solely through the contents of the pro-
mulgated law (Quesnay 1965a: 365). Natural right, as the right to
subsistence and to that which is proper to one’s enjoyment, is not a
right of everybody to everything, but rather a right to that which one
can procure by means of labour, given differences in talents and envi-
ronments (Quesnay 1965a: 366ff). In this Quesnay appears to follow
Locke, who understood the right to property on the basis of work as
the basic right awarded by natural law (for even one’s person is pro-
perty) (cf Locke 1988: Two treatises of government II, v, 27).
From the above it is clear that Quesnay sees the basis of natural
rights as consisting in duties, which are linked to subsistence and pro-
per enjoyment, and which are recognisable by reason. Duties, as we
shall attempt to show, are part of natural law. Enjoyment and subsis-
tence link these duties to non-human nature. It is clear that “natural
law” encompasses much more for Quesnay than the laws of the non-
human or the subrational, and we shall have to ask what is the rela-
tionship between the human and the non-human in the natural order
as well as how the natural order is related to reason and freedom.
2.2 Natural law
Quesnay sees the establishment of larger communities composed of
families as to the advantage of natural rights, on condition that they
are constituted on the basis of those natural laws that can provide the
best possible government. For Quesnay, therefore, there is no state of
nature that ends when civil society begins — “nature” is always pre-
sent. Thus human beings in society have to subject themselves to
both natural and positive laws. In this context he gives a clear defi-
nition of natural law:
Natural laws are either physical or moral. One understands here by
physical law the regulated course of every physical event which is
evidently the most advantageous for humankind. One understands
here by moral law the rule for every human action conforming to
the physical order which is evidently the most advantageous for hu-
mankind. These laws form the ensemble of what is called ‘natural
law’ (Quesnay 1965a: 374-5).
This is a fascinating formulation of natural law. On the one hand
it is peculiarly humanistic, with the physical laws limited to those
regularities which are to the advantage of humankind. In fact, in a
footnote Quesnay recognises that that natural order which is to the
greatest advantage of humankind may not be equally to the advan-
tage of other animals, but the Author of nature, he says, has given
humankind the natural right by virtue of intelligence to make his
part the best possible. On the other hand the formulation tends in
the direction of a kind of “naturalism”, for it defines the natural laws
for morality as conforming to the physical order. The conception ap-
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pears to be dialectical — a tension between the advantage of huma-
nity and conformity to the natural order. Natural law is framed into
human advantage (a discourse of mastery?) and, on the other hand,
subjection to the natural order is prescribed. In Kant this tension re-
appears when he attempts to sustain both the argument that “nature”
is the origin of rational mastery and the contention that reason trans-
cends nature in its mastery of nature (cf Venter 1999a: 31ff).
Although quite subtle, the relationship between humankind and
non-human nature here takes the direction of exploitative domina-
tion. This tendency to move the reference of “natural law” in the di-
rection of the physical sphere and to connect it to human domination
of “nature” can be found as early as Descartes (Discourse on method VI,
1969: 49). But Quesnay goes two steps further: he makes one single
formula of physical law and human advantage, and also converts this
into a presupposition for moral natural law. Kant later (1787) propo-
ses a more radical formulation of the same idea, suggesting that (non-
human) natural laws are actually imposed on nature by a planning rea-
son (cf Kant 1975a: 23-4). And Comte is in the spirit of Quesnay in
his attempt to unify the physical and moral laws to the advantage of
humankind, expanding this into a religion of humanity (as will be ar-
gued below).
On the other hand Quesnay also limits natural morality by de-
manding that it conform to a humanistically understood physical
order. This means that government has to establish a legal structure
conformable to both the moral and the physical order. The impor-
tance of the physical order — in the sense of environment — to hu-
man society had already been stressed by Machiavelli and Bodin. In
physiocratic thinking, however, it became a cornerstone of social
thought. For the foundation of society is, first, the subsistence of hu-
man beings and, secondly, the wealth necessary to protect it (Ques-
nay 1965a: 376). This partly explains the physiocratic preference for
agriculture: believing that the natural order was established by its
Author for the overall good of the universe, and viewing agriculture
as that part of the culture of physical reality which is most advanta-
geous to humankind (the only culture which is supposed to supply a
renewable surplus value). Government was encouraged to take into
account the natural laws which sustain the creation of wealth, and to
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rid itself of any positive laws conflicting with those natural laws,
rather than to blame the farmers for a lack of bread (Quesnay 1965a:
369). Quesnay feels his way in the direction of a base-superstructure
model — resembling that of Marx — when he says that the form of
societies depends more or less on the goods which each member pos-
sesses. Groups which possess only movable property can be nomadic,
but those which have immovable property need a different type of
government (Quesnay 1965a: 372ff).
This side of Quesnay’s thought prefigures the early positivism
found in Turgot. In fact, even Comte vacillated between domination
by the physical environment and the power of humankind in terms
of the engineering of nature. And the dialectical materialism of Marx
was probably the most elaborate expression of this struggle.
In Quesnay, both moral and physical good have their origin in the
natural laws. Each has its own essence and characteristics, conform-
ing to the aims of its Author who, being the Author, is superior to
both — here, the metaphor of the divine lawgiver reappears. The
same laws which produce good, also produce evil. Natural laws that
produce rain also produce floods, but in totality they are intended for
good. Humankind has been given intelligence to draw the best ad-
vantages from them and to avoid those evils which are predictable.
This also means that every human being has the natural right to use
his/her faculties (Quesnay 1965a: 370-1).
2.3 Freedom
Regarding both moral and physical evil, a different cause comes into
operation in human life — the misuse of freedom. Quesnay moves
some distance from the positivist direction in viewing freedom as the
essence of humankind (thus approaching the views of Locke).3
3 “This brings us to a different cause of the physical evil and moral evil, which is
of another kind than the physical laws; it is the bad usage of human freedom.
Freedom, this constitutive attribute of man [and] which man would stretch
outside its boundaries, seems to man to never be at fault: if he does damage to
himself, if he destroys his health, if he wastes his belongings and ruins his fa-
mily by the bad usage of his freedom, he blames the Author of his liberty; when
he would want to be even freer; he does not realise that he is in contradiction
with himself” (Quesnay 1965a: 369).
For Quesnay freedom is real — he explicitly rejects determinism
in an extensive analysis of freedom. The soul is not simply determin-
ed by extrinsic and physical causes, but also by a confluence of ope-
rations which are peculiar to it and which change the whole mecha-
nism of physical impulses preceding decision-making (Quesnay
1965b: 752). Freedom is not unlimited and indeterminate, as if it
concerned arbitrary decisions to act or not to act; it has boundaries in
the natural order, which act as resources for decision-making. It
needs to be preceded by good education, expansion of knowledge, the
power of good habits, and the power of legitimate motives. Quesnay
adds supernatural support to this list (Quesnay 1965b: 754; cf also
1965a: 369-370). Freedom, therefore,
[...] is a faculty relative to motives which are both inciting and sur-
mountable, which counterbalance and weaken one another, and
which present opposing interests and attractions, which reason,
more or less enlightened and more or less preoccupied, examines
and evaluates (Quesnay 1965a: 369).
Natural law therefore does not eliminate freedom in Quesnay, but the
position of freedom in Turgot and Comte is much more precarious.
2.4 Natural law, rationality, education and government
Both natural law and freedom are directly linked to rationality. Ques-
nay did not escape the Enlightenment atmosphere and its form of ra-
tionalism. We have already indicated above that reason knows the
natural laws by way of evidence, and it is also clear that the delibe-
ration of reason is the concrete manifestation of freedom. When we
want to know the order of time and place in order to navigate, Ques-
nay argues, we need to calculate very precisely the laws of movement
of the heavenly bodies. In the same way, when we want to know the
extent of the natural right of people united in society, we have to fo-
cus on the natural laws which are constitutive of the best possible go-
vernment — which will have to be the most advantageous govern-
ment, in both the natural and the positive order (Quesnay 1965a:
374). Epistemologically Quesnay remains in the Cartesian and Scho-
lastic tradition in which natural law was considered evidentially (a
priori) knowable; one could therefore trust in reason to show the way
to the best possible government.
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Quesnay probably has in mind a government that allows for the
free play of market forces and promotes the welfare of agriculture.
This demands education. The first and most fundamental positive
law should be education, both public and private, in the natural laws
that are the sovereign rules of every human legislation and of every
civil, political, economic and social behaviour (Quesnay 1965a: 375).
As in Cicero, Bodin and Locke, natural law is here again the standard
against which civil law is to be evaluated (cf Willey 1961: 14ff; Bo-
din [sa]: 29; Locke 1988: Two treatises of government II, ii, 6).
Without education, the actions of government and citizens are
unintelligible and even anarchic. Without knowledge of the natural
laws which have to serve as the basis of legislation and rules of beha-
viour, there is no evidential understanding of the just and the unjust,
of natural rights, of the physical and moral order, of the essential dis-
tinction between general and particular interests, of the reality of
causes of the prosperity and decline of nations, of the essence of moral
good and moral evil, or of the sacred rights of those who govern and
the duties of those who have to obey (Quesnay 1965a: 375-6). The
knowledge of natural law thus covers a wide range of evidential
(rational) insights.
Although there are many deviations from this due to human im-
perfection, positive law is supposed to be none other than the expo-
sition of the natural laws that are constitutive of the most advanta-
geous order. The “most advantageous order” here means that order
which is most advantageous for the sovereign, for what is really most
advantageous for the sovereign will also be most advantageous for the
subjects. It is only the dominance of the science of these supreme
laws that can assure tranquillity and prosperity in a nation. Where
this is the case, it will be impossible to propose an unreasonable law,
for both government and citizens will soon discover the absurdity of
this. This is particularly true for the subsistence of the nation and the
means to defend it — if the “flame of reason” enlightens the
government, laws detrimental to society will soon be taken off the
books (Quesnay 1965a: 376). The trust in reason here rationalises
something of the nature of an enlightened monarchy or dictatorship4
— a monarch need only be rational. Quesnay still echoes Bodin’s
13
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4 Quesnay (1965c: 330ff) rejects a multiparty system as government by the stronger.
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theory of the absolute, sovereign monarch (cf Bodin [sa]: 28), and
stands at some distance from Locke (cf Two treatises on government II,
ii, 6) in this regard. This position is a little more complicated than a
simple trust in rationality, however. His rationalism is of the softer
kind, which still refers to a proper object (although, as we have seen
above, this object is only known evidentially), and which requires the
development of reason by means of the study of natural laws.5
Reason by itself is not enough to guide behaviour; knowledge is
needed for dignified behaviour. Ignorance is the primal attribute of the
brute and isolated person; in society this is disastrous, even a crime. For
the human being with its intelligence ought to elevate itself above the
brutes, since ignorance is the main source of evil for humans and “of
his indignity towards the Author of nature, the eternal light, the su-
preme reason and the cause of all that is good” (Quesnay 1965a: 377).
In this regard Quesnay’s doctrine is somewhat more sophisticated and
less optimistic than that of Locke, who identified natural law with rea-
son itself (cf Two treatises on government II, ii, 6). In short, for Quesnay it
is enlightened reason which is the guide and in fact the sustainer of so-
ciety. His understanding of “enlightenment” therefore goes in the di-
rection of rationality disclosed into full understanding of the laws of
nature in their evidence.6 This perpetuates Stoic epistemology (in op-
position to skepticism) regarding the knowledge of natural laws, but
given a new inspiration by enlightenment rationalism and its educa-
tional (emancipatory) focus. It is taken further in Kant’s (1975d)
well-known essay Was ist Aufklärung? On the other hand Quesnay al-
5 “We are talking here about reason exercised, expanded and perfected by the stu-
dy of the natural laws. For [the] simple reason alone does not elevate man above
the brute animals; it is in principle only a faculty or an aptitude by which man
can acquire the knowledge which is necessary for him and by which he can,
with his knowledge, procure for himself the physical and moral goods essential
for the nature of his being” (Quesnay 1965a: 376).
6 But the enlightened reason, guided and arrived at the point of knowing with
evidence the course of natural laws, becomes the necessary rule of the best go-
vernment possible, where the observation of these sovereign laws will multiply
in abundance the wealth necessary for the sustenance of the people and for the
maintenance of the tutelary authority — the protection it provides warrants for
human beings, united in society, the ownership of their wealth and the safety
of their persons (Quesnay 1965a: 377).
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ready attributes the difference between humankind and brute ani-
mals to education.
Thus natural rights are extended insofar as one is directed towards
the observation of the best laws, those that constitute the most advan-
tageous order for human beings united in society. What is more, as in
Locke (cf Two treatises of government II, vi, 57), these laws do not limit
human freedom, for evidently they are “the object of the best choice
of freedom”. Humankind cannot reasonably refuse to obey these laws,
for otherwise its freedom will be detrimental to itself and to others —
it will be the freedom of a madman (Quesnay 1965a: 377).
The concepts of natural rights, natural law, freedom, and rationa-
lity, all coalesce in these last sentences. Natural right in society is
clearly connected with the advantage of humankind, which, as has
been seen, encompasses both the physical and the moral order. And
natural rights are based on the observance of these advantageous re-
gularities, of which the observance is not only rational but also an ex-
pression of real freedom.
Quesnay was also struggling with the deeper problem of legitimis-
ing the structuring of society as well as its positive laws. He defended
an absolute justice (cf Quesnay 1965b: 755ff) situated in the natural
order, specifically in reason’s relationship to natural law. This order of
justice is in turn legitimised by supposing that the natural order was
instituted by a Supreme Intelligence who, by virtue of being the one
who instituted it, is itself elevated above this order. This is reminis-
cent of a very long tradition about natural law, which can be found in
Thomas Aquinas, Calvin, Newton and Locke. It brings into focus the
question of the basis or origin of positive law.
Though Quesnay, as an enlightenment economist, trusted in en-
lightened reason to show us the way to a legitimate socio-political
structure, he finally sought refuge in a “theological” intellectualism
— the divine intellect as the source of law. He was still far from the
complete rationalism of Kant, who believed that law is imposed by
reason itself, and one could say that he was seeking to avoid relati-
vism by falling back on a divine absolute. However, human folly (es-
pecially that of the monarchs he still defended) did not open his eyes
to the limitations of reason’s ability to understand such a higher law.
He was a child of the Enlightenment who believed the process of “en-
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lightening” would solve the problems of humankind — rational
knowledge of law would be part of his bequest to positivism.
Finally, Quesnay’s unification of the two meanings of “natural
law” provides a distinction between human moral life and physical
processes as well as a double connection of human control in the ex-
ploitation of the physical and human dependence on the physical.
This distinction becomes a parallel in Turgot, and the relationship of
dependence is accentuated.
3. Turgot (1727-1781): the law of progress and 
natural necessity
Although they both subscribed to some basic principles of physio-
cracy, an atmosphere quite different from that of Quesnay’s writings
pervades the works of Turgot,7 especially his later work, Réflexions sur
la formation et la distribution des richesses (written in 1766). Yet it is
precisely in this work that the influence of Quesnay (as well as that
of Hume) shines through (Meek 1973: 17ff). I believe that Turgot
stands much nearer to positivism than some interpreters would be
ready to grant, probably because philosophical and literary interpre-
ters tend to read his philosophy of history without the Réflexions. Nor
is it readily noted that even in his early writings the idea of progress
is formulated in such a way that a fixed process is presupposed, du-
plicating itself in various human beings and nations. Turgot links
events causally in a history of progress, based upon the principle of
competitiveness as an inevitable motor of progression. Progress is
primarily the accumulation of knowledge — a progress according to
a fixed (law-like) sequence of three phases, which moves from domi-
nance by the subrational to rational control. Progress is, however,
bound by physical necessity to the natural environment. Turgot ini-
tiates the idea of a mental superstructure dependent upon and deter-
mined by a material base.
7 Turgot studied theology, but did not enter the ministry. His early works on his-
tory formed part of his theological studies. He worked very successfully as a
provincial administrator, and had considerable success in upgrading the agri-
cultural economy of his province. He aligned himself with physiocratic econo-
mic theory. As a minister in the French cabinet his economic policies were op-
posed by the elite, and he lost his post.
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3.1 Nature and history
Von Hayek (1952: 106ff) noticed that Turgot anticipated positivism
in viewing the progress of the natural sciences as a gradual emanci-
pation from the application of anthropomorphic concepts to natural
phenomena in terms of three stages. But he did not believe Turgot to
be guilty of a scientistic extension of the methods of natural science
to social phenomena. Manuel (1962: 20ff) goes somewhat further. He
argues that the status of the human order (which appeared to be ruled
by accident or chaos, in contrast to the constancy of the physical or-
der) was saved by Turgot and returned to its central position by ac-
cepting a rule of constancy for human history: “the extraordinary law
of steady perfectibility”.
It is my contention that in searching for inevitability in human his-
tory, Turgot was in effect extending something of the modern natural
sciences approach to the human sciences (as did Descartes, Petty and
Locke before him).8 In On universal history (written early in the 1750s)
Turgot (1973: 98) explicitly states that what applies to the sciences of
“combination” and “observation” (mathematics, logic, physics, and
metaphysics) may also be applied to the sciences of morals and politics.
Turgot is referring here to his own (Lockean) insistence on sensation as
the source of ideas, which are then combined into theses and hypo-
theses. And much later, in the Réflexions, he searches for a social bond
in the material base (to use a term from Marx) of society. He may not
have denied individual liberty but in terms of totality he was surely a
determinist, like Rousseau, Adam Smith and Kant (1975b: 33), who
viewed human collectivity along the lines of the model of the physical
universe. One can see something of this parallel between the natural
and the human sciences in the very words — from the Philosophical re-
view of the successive advances of the human mind (1750) — by which the
two orders are distinguished from each other:
The phenomena of nature, governed as they are by constant laws,
are confined within a circle of revolutions which are always the
same. All things perish, and all things spring up again; and in these
successive acts of generation through which plants and animals re-
produce themselves time does no more than restore continually the
counterpart of what it has caused to disappear.
8 For Descartes see A Discourse on method II; for Petty cf Chalk 1951: 342, and for
Locke An essay concerning human understanding, IV.
The succession of mankind, on the other hand, affords from age to
age an ever-changing spectacle. Reason, the passions, and liberty,
ceaselessly give rise to new events: all these ages are bound up with
one another by a succession of causes and effects which link the pre-
sent state of the world with all those that have preceded it. The ar-
bitrary signs of speech and writing, by providing men with the
means of securing the possession of their ideas and communicating
them to others, have made of all the individual stores of knowledge
a common treasure-house which one generation transmits to an-
other, an inheritance which is always being enlarged by the disco-
veries of each age. Thus the human race, considered over the period
since its origin, appears to the eye of a philosopher as one vast
whole, which itself, like each individual, has its infancy and its ad-
vancement (Turgot 1973: 41).
Firstly, though it is certainly true that Turgot here signals a con-
trast between natural and human phenomena (in that the first is sup-
posed to be cyclical while the second shows a relationship of linear
progression), he is clearly in search of some order in the succession of
human events, which he finds, by analogy with physical events, in
causality. At the beginning of On universal history Turgot (1973: 63)
provides another comparison of the physical versus the human. He
states that we become conscious of reality from the inter-linking of
our ideas, and from the order of the laws which all these ideas follow
in their variations. Through the interrelations of various sensations
one becomes aware of the existence of external objects, and a similar
relationship in the succession of one’s ideas reveals the past. But it is
not only the relations among ideas which are subject to laws — Tur-
got moves in one breath, without clear distinction, from the relations
of ideas to the relations among things. The latter, he says, are “by no
means passive”; they all “act on one another according to their diffe-
rent laws and also according to their distances from one another” —
it is a chain in which we know only a small number of links. Turgot’s
discourse tends in the direction of a causal understanding of human
actions.
Secondly, apart from the foregoing common aspects of the two
areas, there are also differences: the laws governing bodies constitute
physics, which laws are “described, not recounted”, since they are
constant. Human beings (together with animals) present a very dif-
ferent spectacle in that they succeed one another in generations and
they are distributed all over the earth (which brings about certain
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differences). Human beings, “being endowed with a more developed
reason and more liberty of action”, have a wider variety of relation-
ships among themselves and, having developed signs, can transmit
acquired ideas into infinity. A continual combination of accumulated
ideas with human passions constitutes human history, which (as
mentioned above) has the structure of a living being, growing from
infancy to maturity.
The common feature of the two areas is a succession of events sub-
ject to laws and distance (geography is often mentioned as important
for an understanding of progress); the difference is that the physical
remains constant while the animal is subject to growth and decay.
But the overall pattern of the latter is still one of constant progress.
In fact Turgot (1973: 64) states that the human race always remains
the same during difficult times and always proceeds towards perfec-
tion. Kant would later try to solve the problem of inconsistency in
progress — the phenomenon of growth and decay — by saying that
during decline a new society is already being born, which this will
have a higher zenith than the previous one. For Kant, like Turgot,
progress is valid only for the human race as a whole, not for the par-
ticular case or period (cf Venter 1999a: 31ff).
3.2 The principles of progress: self-interest, passion, and
accumulation
One of the causal principles at work in human progress is the prin-
ciple of self-love, upon which politics, morality and even justice are
based (Turgot 1973: 98) — a principle which uses evil to promote
good, ending in an equilibrium (peace). This Enlightenment prin-
ciple is at the basis of Adam Smith’s and (a little later) Immanuel
Kant’s thought (Venter 1992: 192ff; 1999a: 30ff). Turgot (1973: 41)
says that the human mind is moved by self-interest, ambition and
vainglory, yet attains perfection. War is at the basis of development,
and through revolutions and power shifts “everything gradually gets
nearer and nearer to an equilibrium, and in the course of time takes
a more settled and peaceful aspect”. Ambition in time begins to limit
its own ravages: “the evil which is inseparable from revolutions dis-
appears: the good remains and humanity perfects itself” (Turgot
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of the world at different times. Thus although one cannot make the
past present again (as we can do with experiments in physics on the
basis of “the consistency of nature with itself” (cf Turgot 1973: 98),
we can still trace the pattern of progress and determine its principles.
Secondly, Turgot draws attention to the factors in humankind
that are productive of innovation: reason, the passions, and liberty.
Reason actually comes last, for it would have hindered progress had
it come into action at an earlier stage (see below). Turgot favours the
idea of structured linear progression in history.
Thirdly, he singles out the possibility of the succession and accu-
mulation of knowledge as given in the convention of speech and
writing, for human progress is primarily the progress of the mind in
acquiring knowledge — the language of the Enlightenment also
found in Quesnay. This being a cumulative affair, it cannot but fol-
low a linear progression. Working from an almost sensationalist epis-
temology centred on the accumulation of ideas from sense and trans-
ferring these into words, Turgot distinguishes between the early
hunters with a limited but vivid vocabulary, the shepherd with a
more refined language, and the husbandman with his colder and co-
herent language. Meek (1973: 5) sees this theory of phases in the eco-
nomic base, correlated with development in the cultural superstruc-
ture, as very influential in the eighteenth century. The idea of pro-
gress as primarily mental but dependent upon the physical did in fact
prepare the way for more elaborate theories in the same vein in Con-
dorcet and especially in Comte and Marx.
Fourthly, Turgot sees a parallel between the progress of the hu-
man race (which here forms an almost mystical unity), and that of the
maturation of the human individual — an idea which we also find in
Adam Smith, Lessing and (later) Auguste Comte. The suggestion is
again that of a fixed linear progress through phases, and therefore im-
plies a predictability for individual societies.
In fact, the causal linking of human history, in linear progression,
focussing on mental progress, and viewing progress by analogy with
the maturation of the individual, are all ideas developed later by va-
rious strands of positivism.
3.3 The three phases of intellectual progress
The idea of a cumulative progression of knowledge (in the physical
sciences in particular) was in itself not totally new — limited ver-
sions can be found in Roger Bacon, Francis Bacon, Bernard Fonte-
nelle, Descartes and Pascal. But Turgot included all aspects of human
knowledge under it, although he had some doubts about moral
knowledge (cf further Manuel 1962: 21-2; Morley 1892: 95-109).
The anticipation of Comte’s law of three phases in Turgot’s On univer-
sal history was of considerable importance to the understanding of the
later interpretations of law. In the context of the falsification of hy-
potheses and easy analogies, Turgot tells us that initially, before the
coherence of physical events was known, it was natural to ascribe
them to invisible intelligent agents; somewhat later philosophers re-
cognised the absurdity of such explanations and replaced them with
meaningless abstractions; the advent of mechanistic explanations fi-
nally replaced bad metaphysics.9
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9 “Before men were conversant with the mutual interconnection of physical ef-
fects, nothing was more natural than to suppose that these were produced by
intelligent beings, invisible and resembling ourselves [...] Everything that hap-
pened, without men having a hand in it, had its god, in respect of whom fear
or expectation soon led to the establishment of a cult; and this cult was once
again devised on the model of the respect which people might have for powerful
men. For the gods were only more powerful men [...]
“When the philosophers had recognised the absurdity of these fables, without
yet having acquired any real understanding of natural history, the idea struck
them to explain the causes of phenomena by way of abstract expressions like
essences or faculties: expressions which in fact explained nothing, and about
which men reasoned as if they were beings, new gods substituted for the old
ones. Following these analogies, faculties were proliferated in order to provide
a cause for each effect. [...]
“It was only much later, through observation of the mechanical action which
bodies have upon one another, that men derived from this mechanics other
hypotheses which mathematics was able to develop and experiment to verify.
That is why physics did not cease degenerating into bad metaphysics until a
long period of progress in the arts and in chemistry had multiplied the
combination of bodies, and until, with the development of closer
communications between societies, geographical knowledge had become more
extensive, facts had become more certain, and the practice of the arts had itself
Turgot clearly anticipates the central ideas of Comte’s law of three
phases — divinities as causes, followed by abstract metaphysical en-
tities, followed by relations between things (understood here in a
Cartesian way as mechanical relations). His perspective is much
wider though — he includes the whole variety of mental activities
(communications, geography, the arts, and the society of scientists)
in the development; Comte focussed much more one-sidedly on the
history of the scientific intellect.
The idea of three phases in the development of human mental
capacity may not have been original in Turgot. Gay (1969: 109) finds
an interesting anticipation of Turgot’s stages in Roger Cotes’ preface
to the second edition of Newton’s Principia. Cotes argues that there
are natural philosophers — the Aristotelians — who have “attribut-
ed to the several species of things, specific and occult qualities, on
which, in a manner unknown, they make the operations of the several
bodies depend”. Rejecting this, some other philosophers regard mat-
ter as homogeneous, and speculate on the simple foundations of the
world: “hypotheses” which according to Cotes are no more than “in-
genius romances”. And finally there are philosophers who “profess
experimental philosophy” (cf Newton 1974: 117ff). Turgot’s disco-
very was in the air, says Gay.
If Gay is right that there is a connection between Cotes and Tur-
got, then it is a very weak one, and Gay has been very selective in his
reading of Cotes. Cotes distinguishes three classes of natural philoso-
phers, but he does not indicate any succession among them. The first
group uses occult qualities situated in the natures of things, which
according to Cotes provides no explanation, with no reference to an-
thropomorphic divinities. The second group is on the right track
since they proceed from the simple to the compound, but they hypo-
thesise “unknown figures and magnitudes [...] uncertain situations
and motions of parts [...] and occult fluids” (Newton 1974: 117) —
and then attempt to deduce consequences from these. This is again
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been brought to the attention of the philosophers. Printing, literary and scien-
tific journals, and the transactions of Academies increased the degree of certain-
ty until today it is only the details which remain in doubt” (Turgot 1973: 102;
cf also Gay 1969: 109).
not near enough to Turgot’s second phase of supposing “faculties” or
“essences” (Cote’s first group shows more resemblance to Turgot’s se-
cond phase). Turgot’s third phase is one of a combination of hypothe-
tical argument with experimental observation in the context of a
wider intellectual maturity; Cotes’ third group is supposed to reject
hypotheses and to work from strictly observational principles. In
fact, whereas the Newtonian tradition rejected the use of hypotheses
as falsification procedures, Turgot believed that even wrong hypothe-
ses (or whole systems) serve progress (an implication which is also
implicit in Comte’s law of three phases).10
Turgot’s theory of the three stages was probably more a product
of his Lockean theory of knowledge than of Cotes’ three classes. He
does not tire of repeating that all of humankind’s knowledge is “con-
tained within actual sensation” and consists in combinations of ideas
compared with observation (Turgot 1973: 93, cf also 42).11 The three
phases actually indicate how humankind learned to make better use
of its senses and reason — explaining the movement of physical bo-
dies with the help of anthropomorphic analogies, then through ab-
stract entities as causes, and finally in terms of the interrelations of
the bodies themselves. But the science of history underwent similar
development (cf Turgot 1973: 92ff).
Turgot also connects his theory of the development of science
with phased development in other sectors of culture. In fact, the dif-
ferences among cultures indicate the phase in which each is situated.
Thus they present (in cross section) all the shades of barbarism and
civilisation at one moment. In the present state of the world’s deve-
lopmental inequality (“all the gradations from barbarism to refine-
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10 “From all this it may be concluded that men were bound to pass through a
thousand errors before arriving at the truth. Hence that host of systems, each
one less sound than the other, which nevertheless represent real progress, [...]
systems [...] which give rise to research and are for this reason useful in their ef-
fects. Hypotheses are not harmful: all those that are false destroy themselves.
[...] The first step is to find a system; the second is to become disgusted with
it” (Turgot 1973: 101-2).
11 His epistemology in fact has a stronger empiricist leaning than that of Locke,
for he also reduces self-knowledge to sensations of external objects (Turgot
1973: 63), whereas Locke allowed for ideas of reflection as a separate category.
ment”), we can “at a single glance” see the “records and remains of all
steps taken by the human mind, a reflection of all the stages through
which it had passed, and the history of all the ages” (Turgot 1973: 42;
cf also Morley 1892: 102; Manuel 1962: 33-6). The belief in the
superiority of European civilisation compared to the other cultures
(including the Chinese) which had become known since the
Renaissance was the basis for the method of a universal historiography
— a retro-projection into the past primitive origins of all mankind,
and an extrapolation into its future glory. A synchronic comparison of
cultures was supposed to show the diachronic progress of humankind.
It is noteworthy that some decades later Condorcet developed a
similar theory of progress on the basis of Locke’s epistemology. Kant
(1975c), in an essay about the origins of humankind, rationalises
exactly this method of retropolation into the past and extrapolation
into the future in an effort to explain the progress of humankind.
Turgot pioneered the idea of progress and its accompanying method.
3.4 From subrational to rational
Nature is an extension of providence — in Turgot God is reduced to
a vague providence behind nature, and religion is included in the fac-
tors of progress. The inevitability of progress is linked to this. Turgot
refers to both the passions (“nature”) and reason as factors of innova-
tion. Both have an essential role to play in the progress of humankind
— the passions dominating the childhood phase, and reason the ma-
ture phase. More subtly than Rousseau, for example (cf Venter 1999:
21ff), yet still clearly, Turgot sees progress from the subrational to the
rational. As in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century economists and
his contemporary Adam Smith, as well as in Kant somewhat later, it
is self-love (in this case ambition) which is the natural driving force.
In the background can still be heard Hobbes’ belief in the naturalness
of competition for power, honour and wealth (cf Venter 2000b). Thus,
as Quesnay had already said, evil is part of the overall good, and as
Lessing, Adam Smith, and Kant had it, history moves in phases from
the domination of the subrational to that of reason (cf further Venter
1999a: 4ff).12
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12 “Ambition gathered strength, politics lent it perspectives, and the progress of
the mind enlarged them: hence a thousand different forms of government. The
Turgot incorporates the subrational into the history of progress.
Passions, even evil ones which lead to domination and war, are part
of the process which brings to fulfilment the plan of Providence for
enlightenment and happiness, even though ambitious geniuses do
not have these aims in mind or even know where they are headed (cf
also Gay 1969: 111). The close association between nature (and Pro-
vidence or God) and the subrational is also present in Turgot when
he says, a few lines further on, “before laws had formed manners,
these odious passions were still necessary for the defence of indivi-
duals and peoples”; they were “the leading strings with which nature
and its Author guided the human race in its infancy” (Turgot 1973:
71). These words were echoed in the writings of the later Kant, who
viewed humanity in its infancy as on the leading strings of nature
working via war and competition, although Kant supposed the awa-
kening of reason to occur in this early period of humankind (cf Kant
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first were necessarily the product of war, and thus implied government by one
man alone. We need not believe that men ever voluntarily gave themselves one
master; but they have often agreed in recognising one chief. And the ambitious
themselves, in forming great nations, have contributed to the designs of Provi-
dence, to the progress of enlightenment, and thus to the increase in the happi-
ness of the human race, with which they were not concerned at all. [...] Thus the
passions have led to the multiplication of ideas, the extension of knowledge, and
the perfection of the mind, in the absence of that reason whose day had not yet
come and which would have been less powerful if its reign had arrived earlier.
Reason, which is justice itself, would not have taken away from anyone what be-
longed to him, would have banished wars and usurpations for ever, and would
have left men divided up into a host of nations separated from one another and
speaking different languages. As a result the human race, limited in its ideas,
incapable of that progress in all kinds of understanding, and in the sciences, arts,
and government, which arises from the collective genius of different regions,
would have remained forever in a state of mediocrity. Reason and justice, if they
had been more attended to, would have immobilised everything [...] But what
is never perfect ought never to be entirely immobilised. The passions, tumul-
tuous and dangerous as they are, became a mainspring of action and conse-
quently of progress; everything which draws men away from their present con-
dition, and everything which puts varied scenes before their eyes, extends the
scope of their ideas, enlightens them, stimulates them, and in the long run leads
them to the good and the true, to which they are drawn by their natural bent”
(Turgot 1973: 70).
1975b: 33ff; 1975c: 87ff). Turgot, however, does not mean to imply
that God must take responsibility for contingent evil, but rather that
Providence uses it to the advantage of mankind — his early theolo-
gical training still surfaces here.
Though subrational, the passions play an important role in the in-
novation of ideas, the accumulation of knowledge and even the per-
fection of the mind itself. There are two kinds of passions, the “odi-
ous” ones which are violent, and the gentle ones which develop later
and ameliorate the violent ones — but both kinds are “natural” and
“necessary”. Turgot for example ascribes to “instinct, that feeling for
the good and the honourable which Providence has graven on all our
hearts” the role of leading the philosophers of all ages during the in-
fancy of reason to “the same fundamental principles of the science of
behaviour” (Turgot 1973: 49-50). On the one hand nature (Provi-
dence) brings a law-like and a priori universal validity to moral prin-
ciples (which strongly reminds one of the tradition of “natural law”
as we find it in Locke or Quesnay), but on the other the principles are
part of the subrational and thus Turgot borders on pragmatism in his
acceptance of every process that works for progress regardless of its
aims and motives.
As in Rousseau and Kant the rational situation is the later phase
of the process (cf Venter 1999a: 21ff). Reason is a directly positive so-
cial faculty; it is justice itself and therefore peaceful. If it assumed do-
minance too early, it could not have established the tension-ridden
intellectual world culture in which geniuses of one nation adopt the
progress of another (even in cases where the less developed usurps the
more progressive). Thus irrational “nature” plays a dominant role in
progress.
3.5 The law of unequal progress
Turgot distinguished four areas of progress from which he derived
the law of unequal progress (cf Turgot 1973: 48ff). The areas of tech-
nology, science, moral behaviour and artistic expression each follow a
different development pattern. The resources of science are to be
found everywhere that human beings are, and the “most exalted
mental attainments are only and can only be a development or com-
bination of the original ideas based on sensation”, hence “the same
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senses, the same organs, and the same spectacle of the universe have
everywhere given men the same ideas, just as the same needs and in-
clinations have everywhere taught them the same arts” (Turgot 1973:
42). Artisans are directly concerned with the needs of life, and there-
fore technologies develop merely because time passes. Importantly,
the arts are no more than “a succession of physical experiments” un-
veiling nature while utilising it (Turgot 1973: 56). War and domi-
nation do not therefore have a destructive effect on them. With the
structure of the human being — the senses as the basis of his theore-
tical life and the needs as the spring of practical life — the structure
of humankind’s developmental history is given. Comte would take
this further and use the practical needs to unify the practical and the
theoretical in his version of the progress of the human mind.
Turgot (like Hume; cf Venter 1995: 136ff) had a hedonistic view
of the fine arts — they are there for our pleasure and limited by the
capacities of our sense organs, our imitation of nature and the deve-
lopment of our language; thus they have an upper limit. He believed
that the arts had reached a summit in the Augustan age, of which later
ages produced only imitations. He accepted a universal (natural) mo-
ral code consisting of Stoic virtues, utility, and Christian love, and res-
pected the traditions of the church (even though he had left it). Moral
progress was to be achieved through the reduction of morals to a
science of observation, which would lead to a rational morality imply-
ing the end of war, cruelty, and crime, as well as a positive striving for
the happiness of others (cf Manuel 1962: 3; 9-40; Gay 1969: 108ff).
Although in the earlier periods science had to learn from techno-
logy, Turgot believed these roles would be reversed in the course of
progress. For Turgot, science meant illumination, implying enlight-
enment (truth), social change and even happiness in a rational con-
text. The genius was the mediator of novelty in all areas. He could
be suppressed by society; Turgot followed Locke in pleading for tole-
rance. Rather error than repetition or stagnation; mistakes might
lead one temporarily astray, but would in the long run contribute to
progress. Science had progressed so far that it would be impossible to
stop the Enlightenment from spreading. Importantly, language had
developed the most sophisticated form possible in the notational sys-
tems of mathematics, and other sciences were moving towards using
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mathematics as their form of expression. Mathematics was considered
to progress faster since the comparison of ideas among themselves is
simpler than the comparison of ideas with observations (a notion
adopted and adapted by Comte). Mathematical formulations would
make any retrogression impossible — even moral knowledge would
be protected by this (cf Morley 1892: 103; Manuel 1962: 29ff; 43).
Turgot sustained the spirit of Locke and Descartes in the sense that
he idealised mathematical deduction as the guarantee of truth in the
human sciences, but he sensed the lingual side of the argumentation
(which they did not). But in stressing a deductive quantitative ap-
proach, he implicitly strengthened the determinist side of his view of
the human disciplines.
3.6 The social classes
Although Turgot himself was not a mathematician, his approach to
matters of academic importance, such as his Réflexions sur la formation
et la distribution des richesses, clearly shows the traits of an admirer of
the quantitative procedures of empirical science. Von Hayek (1952:
106) believes that Turgot was not yet guilty of transferring the pro-
cedures of the natural sciences to the social sciences, but in the fol-
lowing discussion I shall try to show that Turgot constructed his
view of society as a whole on the basis of the single principle of phy-
sical necessity.
Turgot argues that an equal distribution of land could never have
existed, for trade (exchange) would then have been impossible. Since
there are different types of soil and different needs, and since the raw
produce of land needs preparation before it can be used, specialisa-
tion, trade and exchange came into being (Turgot 1922: 3-74). Like
Quesnay and his fellow physiocrats, Turgot insists on the pre-emi-
nence of agriculture. What agriculture produces beyond the wants of
the farmer is supposed to be the only source of the salaries of the
other members of society.13
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13 “It must however be observed that the Husbandman, furnishing all with the
most important and most considerable article of their consumption, (I mean
their food and also the materials of every industry) has the advantage of a grea-
ter independence. His labour, in the sequence of the labours divided among the
different members of the society, retains the same primacy, the same pre-emi-
Turgot supposes food to be the most basic stuff among all pro-
ducts of the land, and the land to produce the materials for all indus-
tries. Of course he could not have predicted the production of artifi-
cial materials, not derived from agriculture, on the massive scale
which we find today. First, agriculture is awarded primacy among all
kinds of labour by physical necessity. Secondly, the bond of society is
based on the exchange of products of labour, which has its origin in
the surplus value (produced by the husbandman) through which the
products of the labour of the artisan are acquired. Turgot’s idea of the
social bond approaches that of Adam Smith, though the latter’s view
allowed for an exchange of “good offices” and was therefore less ma-
terialistic than Turgot’s.
Thus Turgot by “necessity” distinguishes the “productive class”
(husbandmen) from the “stipendiary class” (artisans and others).
Whereas competitive bargaining compels the stipendiary class to
work for wages just equal to the necessities of life, the husbandman
is in a very different position. For nature does not bargain with him
to be satisfied with the bare necessities of life. What nature gives is
not in proportion to his wants or to a contractual valuation of his
labour — it is the “physical result” of the fertility of the soil and
the prudence with which he cultivates it (Turgot 1922:9), making it
possible for him to produce a disposable income.14
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nence, as the labour which provided his own food had among the different
kinds of labour which, when he worked alone, he was obliged to devote to his
different kinds of wants. We have here neither a primacy of honour nor of dig-
nity; it is one of physical necessity (necessité physique). The Husbandman, we may
say in general terms, can get on without the labour of the other workmen but
no workmen can labour if the Husbandman does not enable him to live. In this
circulation, which, by the reciprocal exchange of wants, renders men necessary
to one another and forms the bond of the society, it is, then, the labour of the
Husbandman which imparts the first impulse” (Turgot 1922: 7).
14 “Here then we have the whole of society divided, by a necessity founded on the
nature of things (par une necessité fondée sur la nature des choses), into two classes,
equally industrious. But one of these by its labour produces, or rather draws from
the land, riches which are continually springing up afresh, and which supplies
the whole society with its subsistence and with the materials for all its needs.
The other, occupied in giving to materials thus produced the preparations and
the forms which render them suitable for the use of men, sells its labour to the
first class and receives in exchange its subsistence” (Turgot 1922: 10).
Turgot believed that having one’s land cultivated by others, for
economic reasons, was not a viable option before a public force and a
law superior to the individual force had come into being. The only
way to keep land, then, was to continue cultivating it. The surplus
value produced by the land made it possible for some to buy the la-
bour of others to cultivate their lands — and thus to separate the
ownership of land from cultivation. Very soon this would also lead to
inequality in the ownership of land, for larger families had more
hands to cultivate; temperament (fears for the future) drove some to
cultivate more than others; the unequal fertility of land caused dif-
ferent yields. This whole process changed land into a commodity to
be bought and sold, and finally ensured the separation of ownership
and cultivation (Turgot 1922: 12-4). This argument leads to the de-
duction of three classes: the two classes already mentioned (in civil
society both consist of wage earners working only for subsistence),
and the class of proprietors, called the “disposable” class, for they re-
ceive the surplus value of the productive class, the only revenue of the
state, and they are available for public service, since they are free from
the burden of wage labour (Turgot 1922:15). Later Turgot shows that
one can also distinguish a capitalist class, which acquires its status
particularly by means of savings, but whose members belong in prac-
tice to the three classes already mentioned.
My intention is not primarily to discuss Turgot’s views of society
in detail, but rather to show how he developed his arguments to ar-
rive at his social view, and what this implies for the question of na-
tural law. It is worthwhile to note the way in which Turgot summa-
rised the relationship among the three classes, and the discourse he
used to express this. He argued that the cultivator produces his own
wages as well as the income of the proprietors and the wages of the
artisans. The proprietor depends on the cultivator “through the ne-
cessity of the physical order”, for the land produces nothing for him
without the labour of the cultivator, whereas the latter is bound to
the proprietor only by virtue of human conventions and civil law.
These latter guarantee to the proprietor only the surplus value of the
land, for he must allow for the subsistence of the cultivator. And then
in one pregnant sentence Turgot seals the argument:
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The Cultivator, confined though he is to the recompense of his la-
bour, thus preserves that natural and physical primacy which renders
him the first mover of the whole machine of Society and which
causes his own subsistence as well as the wealth of the Proprietor and
the wages of all the other labourers to depend on his labour alone
(Turgot 1922: 17).
3.7 Natural necessity
Turgot scarcely uses the expression “natural law”. He rather plays
with the notion of “natural and physical necessity” as opposed to “hu-
man conventions and civil law”. In effect, however, he weaves the
whole structure of society from the threads of the material base. It is
true that he shows a liberal spirit, especially in his insistence on a to-
tally free market (both nationally and internationally and in both
commodities and in money). But such a spirit is not always free of a
determinist view of society, as Kant’s “leading strings of nature”
clearly shows. One may perceive a dialectical tension here.
In conclusion: it is surely possible to sustain the view that Turgot,
given his views on the inevitability of progress, his theory of the
three phases of progress, his natural sciences approach to the human
sciences, and his structuring of society on the basis of the physical ne-
cessity of the work of the farmer, anticipated the views of Comte. In
this way he helped create an atmosphere of validity for arguments in
the social sciences to be modelled after the style of physical science,
taking their point of departure from physical reality. Turgot helped
to pioneer a “physicalist” outlook in the social sciences.
4. Auguste Comte (1798-1857) — law and the 
religion of humanity
In Comte,15 known as the father of Positivism, the idea of natural law
comes to a certain completion. “Natural law” and “law” in fact be-
come the same thing. His ideas were the outcome of a long develop-
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15 Auguste Comte studied at the École Polytechnique, and taught mathematics
for a living. He was for some time associated with the socialist Saint Simon. He
wrote his major scientistic, positivist work, Cours de philosophie positive, between
1830 and 1842. His later love for Clotilde de Vaux focussed his attention on
the importance of love in human life.
ment of which a few preparations have been outlined above. Quesnay
had already unified the two meanings of natural law (rational princi-
ples of human behaviour and physical regularities) into one concept
covering two types of natural law (the physical and the moral). And
Turgot had explained human behaviour as subject to natural necessity,
and given primacy to the material base in his understanding of this
natural necessity. Condorcet also anticipated Comte in the belief that
the material environment dominates human progress. Like his prede-
cessors, Comte mentions Diderot and Hume, Fontenelle and Condor-
cet, De Maistre, Francis Bacon, Descartes, Roger Bacon, Thomas
Aquinas, Dante and “the incomparable” Aristotle (Comte 1957: 5-7).
Surprisingly he does not mention Turgot, who clearly anticipated his
law of three phases. But neither does he mention Saint-Simon, with
whom he co-operated for many years.
Knowing the limitations of a purely non-religious, intellectual,
scientific approach to human problems the mature Comte goes in
search of an object of love which can find a higher meaning for the
selfish and those engaged in trivial scientific pursuits. These latter
contribute to the fragmentation of life, and Comte requires of the ob-
ject of love to return at least a subjective unity of the human person
and of social life. He argues for the reintroduction of religion with
humanity as its divine object of love. But positive faith takes us back
directly to the laws governing both inner-human and exterior pheno-
mena — it is in subjection to these laws that both freedom and the
control of nature lie. Even intellectual progress (in three phases, as
proposed by Turgot) is governed by an unavoidable static law, and
these laws mirror the external universal order. The love for humanity
directs us in disclosing the possibilities for human exploitation in
this order — a hierarchy with the physical as its base and the moral
at its summit, expressing on the one hand the dependence of man on
the subrational world, and on the other the supreme good for which
all control and exploitation take place. But in Comte’s understanding
of law, as well as his scientific methodology, the natural science ap-
proach dominates, and when his humanistic religion is rejected, an
engineering objectification of the human being remains.
32
Acta Academica 2002: 34(1)
4.1 Transcendence in immanence: the religion of 
humanity
The problem of the coherence of subject and object and the variety of
things in the world was not acute in the Middle Ages, for medieval
thinkers thought of the world as a creation cohering through God’s
will and laws, the certain of knowledge as guaranteed by faith, illu-
mination, and the creaturely rationality of humankind. Modern
thinkers moved the basis of certainty into human consciousness, and
had either to view the laws of creation as given to knowledge in an a
priori sense (Descartes), or to assume that human reason autonomous-
ly imposes law onto the world, and that the coherence of the world
is the product of reason (Kant, Hegel). As early as Quesnay, we find
a strongly diminished role of the “supernatural” vis-à-vis the “natu-
ral”; in Turgot only a vague “providence”. Comte explicitly rejects
the “supernatural” in favour of a complete “naturalism” — he differ-
ed from Kant by absolutising law as the final master that we all have
to obey. Comte then reinvents the “supernatural” as part of the “na-
tural” by absolutising humanity into the “Great Being” in order to
find a basis for morality, as well as at least a subjective coherence
among the variety of laws (in this he agreed with Kant), and the dua-
lism of the physical versus the moral in human life. His late work,
Catéchisme positiviste (1852), provides a condensed explication of his
mature thought. Our focus here will be on Comte’s two absolutes,
humanity and law, as they are presented in this work.
In the name of the past and the future, the theoretical servants and
the practical servants of HUMANITY have dignifiedly taken over
the general direction of earthly affairs, in order to finally construe
the true moral, intellectual, and material providence, while exclu-
ding irrevocably all the slaves of God, catholic, protestant, or deist,
from political supremacy, as being both backwards and disturbers
(Comte 1957: 1).16
This was the proclamation with which Comte concluded his Cours
philosophique sur l’histoire générale de l’Humanité (1851). The ideas con-
tained in the proclamation were given further shape in the second vo-
lume of the Système de politique positive, and are therefore a good indi-
cation of the formative aims of Comte’s later work. The philosophy
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16 This and the following translations from Catéchisme positiviste are all mine — JJV).
of humanity unveils itself here as a political “theology” which repla-
ces the “supernatural” conception of God with the “natural” one of
“humanity” in the context of a quasi-historical ontology of reality
structured-for-progress, according to which the divine (humanity)
works at its own perfection over time. Perfection in this case means
an improved ability to follow the higher (more complex) laws with-
out being jeopardised by the more dominant, lower (simpler) laws.
Politically Comte was looking for a social unity in the form of socio-
cracy to replace the outdated aristocracy as well as “anarchic” demo-
cracy. Philosophically he was looking for the unification of human
life in the context of a variety of laws and the dualism of soul and
body — “knowing that which is, in order to foresee that which will
be, with the aim of improving it” (Comte 1957: 70). The religion of
Humanity had to fulfil all these roles.
To place humanity in the position of focus or destination of indi-
vidual action was not exceptional; it was inherent in the historical
ontology constructed by humanism at least from the days of Defoe,
Lessing, Rousseau, and Kant. The human-centred teleology of nature
is a product of the Enlightenment, explicated by Comte in its full re-
ligious implications. Comte anticipates Skinner and the technicists
in the belief that humanity can take charge of its own perfection by
means of the knowledge of natural law.
At the basis of Comte’s idea of the religion of Humanity lies the
problem that in terms of a naturalist approach, the human being is
delivered over to its instincts and the need to provide the means of
survival. These tendencies are egoist, and viewed from this perspec-
tive fellow human beings are creatures (not God’s image as in the
Judaeo-Christian tradition) reduced to simply enemies or competitors.
The consequence of a Hobbesian natural condition, in which short-
term interests take precedence over long-term interests, and personal
good over that of others, looms large here.
Comte is very conscious of this problem, and allows his dialogue
partner in the Catéchisme positiviste to state it in many different forms.
His solution is a “transcendence” within immanence. Referring to
the ancient situation in which religion encompassed both the physi-
cal (such as prescriptions for health) and the moral in an integrated
unity, and the powerlessness of “modern” medicine to persuade
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people scientifically to follow lifestyles which are healthy in the long
run, he argues that “one needs to invoke an authority superior to
every individuality [...] to impose really effective rules, [...] founded
on a social appreciation which never allows for any indecision”
(Comte 1957: 50). In other words, if society enforces the rules of a
healthy lifestyle they will be followed. Comte realises, however, that
if such an external supreme power is not loved by its subjects and
therefore is not internalised in some way, it will not have authority.
Our actions (practice) and our thoughts (and therefore also theory)
are always directed by our affections (of which the sentiments are the
highest), and these need to be co-ordinated by a dominant instinct.
This is the first condition of the universal religion. Internally, there-
fore, the principle of love must be at work, but — and this is the se-
cond condition — externally, intellectual faith must point us to the
real object of love (humanity).17 Comte does not seem to trust Kant’s
belief that rational autonomy has credibility in itself.
The word “religion”, well understood, expresses the realisation of
these two conditions, for “it indicates the state of complete unity that
distinguishes our existence, both personally and socially, when all its
parts, as much moral as physical, converge habitually towards a com-
mon destination”, consisting therefore in “regulating” the individu-
al and “rallying” individuals as a collective (Comte 1957: 46). One
could say that religion is here still understood in the sense of a causa
finalis (final destination) as a unifying factor (reflecting Comte’s asso-
ciation with the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas). In its humanist
orientation, however, it also works in the direction of the kind of col-
lectivism which would later develop in the different strains of social-
ism. Outwardly, Comte’s religion acts through positive faith — the
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17 “But this interior condition of the unity would not be enough if the intelligence
did not make us recognise on the outside, a superior power, to which our exis-
tence must always submit itself, while modifying it. It is with the aim of better
submitting to this supreme empire, that our moral harmony, individual or collec-
tive, becomes especially indispensable. Reciprocally, this preponderance of the
outside tends to regulate the inside, by favouring the ascendance of the most re-
concilable instinct with such a necessity. Thus the two general conditions of reli-
gion are naturally connected, especially when the exterior order can become the
object of the interior sentiment” (Comte 1957: 51-2).
faith of the mature intellect which has left behind the theological as
well as the metaphysical search for causes and focuses directly on
laws.18 Positive faith has only one object, and that is to conceive the
universal order which dominates human existence, aiming to deter-
mine the general relationship of humankind to that order. Every re-
ligious doctrine rests necessarily, Comte says, on an explanation of
the relationship between the world and humankind. It does not mat-
ter what kind of explanation is followed, it necessarily comes down
to an appreciation of this order which is independent of us, with the
aim of better subjecting ourselves to it and modifying it (Comte
1957: 56).
The strong intellectualist strain of the Aristotelian tradition is di-
minished in Comte’s positive religion. Positivism in the philosophi-
cal format presented until then suffered from two deficiencies of the
scientific spirit: arrogance and dryness (Comte 1957: 62). But as po-
sitive religion it satisfies not only action and intelligence, but also
the sentiment which “forms its principal domain and becomes the
base of its unity” (Comte 1957: 10). The final synthetic conception
is as favourable to the “heart” as to the “spirit” (Comte 1957: 62).
Elsewhere Comte (1957: 63) says that the doctrine of the “immense
and eternal being, Humanity” consecrates “the preponderance of the
heart over the spirit as the unique base of our veritable unity”. As
long as positive science was focused in the material and even the vi-
tal, there was no object of love — its expansion into the area of the
human sciences provides this object.
In this mature phase Comte also limits the scientism with which
positivism is often associated (cf Von Hayek 1952: 53ff, 87ff; cf also
Venter 1996b: 234ff). He allows “the degree of approximation [...] to
be regulated by our practical needs, that measure the precision sui-
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18 “The positive faith unveils directly the effective laws (lois) of the diverse obser-
vable phenomena, as much interior as exterior; that is to say, their constant re-
lations of succession and of similitude, which allow us to foresee them [the phe-
nomena] one after the other [...] In its theoretical conceptions it explains always
how (comment) and never why (pourquoi). But when it indicates the means to di-
rect our activity, it makes, on the other hand, the consideration of the aim to
constantly prevail; since thus the practical effect emanates certainly from an
intelligent will” (Comte 1957: 57).
table for our theoretical forecasts” (Comte 1957: 174), in the sense
(anticipated by Descartes) of a “common exploitation of the human
planet” (Comte 1957: 4), though a peaceful one. Like Kant and Marx,
who both expected progress towards lasting peace in the final phase of
history, Comte envisaged the overcoming of human conflict, but then
through his universal religion. Whereas the preceding perspectives
(the theological and the metaphysical) are “fictional”, positive doc-
trine is “always characterised by a combination of reality with utility”
(Comte 1957: 7). The rule is that systematic thinking is preceded by
spontaneous action on the basis of affection (Comte 1957: 70-71). In
fact the principle of love and altruism — “to live for the other”
(Comte 1957: 54) — takes root as a gradual process of subjecting (not
negating) the primary egoistic survival instincts by practising socia-
bility. This conforms to the natural law that suppresses or develops
our organs and functions in proportion to the measure in which we
use or fail to use them (Comte 1957: 52-5). By concentrating one’s ac-
tions outside the individual person in the Great Being, unity is found
in personal life (the moral and the physical, the practical and the theo-
retical are brought into coherence), as well as in social life (where the
other assumes primacy). This unity is expressed in:
[...] the sacred formula of positivism: Love as a principle; Order as
base; Progress as goal (Comte 1957: 63).
The “sacred formula” makes “order” into the basis of Positivism. This
introduces the meaning of the network of terms used by Comte in
connection with “order”: “law”, “natural law”, “universal order” and
even “fatality” and “hazard”.
4.2 Law
In a context where the only essential object of positive faith is cha-
racterised as conceiving the universal, independent order which do-
minates human existence, by studying its “real laws” (in contrast to
searching for its “fictional causes”), Comte (1957: 57) approaches a
definition of “law”:
Positive faith reveals directly the effective laws (lois) of diverse ob-
servable phenomena, as much interior as exterior, that is to say, their
constant relations of succession and similitude, which permit us to
foresee them one after the other. It discards, as radically inaccessible
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and profoundly vain, every research about causes properly said, pri-
mary or final, of any events. In its theoretical conceptions, it expli-
cates always how and never why.
The practical aims of theory are still clearly visible in this defini-
tion: the knowledge of laws is limited to how things happen, how
events succeed or mirror one another, with the aim of forecasting
(and control). Just as we cannot explain events by reference to causes,
so also laws cannot be explained, for they are the condition of every
reasonable explanation, which always consists in subsuming a parti-
cular event under a general law (Comte 1957: 58-9). All phenomena,
also the interior ones (intelligence and sociability), are subject to
such invariable laws (Comte 1957: 59). The invariability of the laws
does not exclude their modifiability; the more complicated the phe-
nomena are, the more modifiable the order is. Comte slips from
“order” to “law” and back, without clearly distinguishing them, but
equally, without actually identifying them: he assures us that even
though the order is modifiable, the fundamental conditions of all
phenomena (even the complex ones) are always unchangeable. Al-
though secondary conditions are therefore changeable, such changes
do not alter the “real laws”, since they never become arbitrary. Total
immobility, would however, be contrary to the notion of law itself,
since law “characterises especially the constancy perceived in the
midst of variety” (Comte 1957: 61).
4.3 Law, order, and freedom
Comte easily moves from the above description of “law” to “natural
order” — the latter does not seem to constitute for him a specific kind
of order. In fact he ascribes to Positivism the re-establishment of the
“natural order” in the sense that it brings the physical and moral or-
ders back to the unity which they initially had in ancient religious
practice (Comte 1957: 49). This leaves us with an ambiguous position
with regard to human action or praxis — we are both subjected to,
and modifiers of law. Comte says that ancient humankind felt sub-
jected to an absolute “fatality” since phenomena were conceived of as
the products of arbitrary, superhuman wills. As the realisation that
phenomena are subject to laws occurred first with regard to heavenly
events, where human intervention is impossible, this fatalist attitude
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was confirmed. But as knowledge of the real order developed, there
was a realisation that this order is modifiable (Comte 1957: 59-60).
Comte calls this a “modifiable fatality” which destines the human
being to both “resignation” and “activity” (Comte 1957: 61). Exactly
how this modification is supposed to occur remains unclear; Comte
reiterates Kant’s idea that the human subject imposes laws; moderates
this to “modification”, and includes suggestions of “engineering”.
Comtean naturalism, like that of eighteenth-century thinkers such as
Kant, is inverted into a teleological, human-centred doctrine by the
“deification” of humanity (cf also Venter 1999a: 26ff): order is our
destination. Or it is chance for us, in proportion to our knowledge of
it: if we do not know a particular law, then it does not exist for us, and
we are therefore unable to act according to predictions in that area;
such events are characterised as “hazard” (cf Comte 1957: 168-9).
It is order and its underlying laws which characterise human free-
dom. Comte denies that freedom is incompatible with “real order”,
saying that it “consists especially in following without obstacles the
proper laws in the corresponding case”, as when a body falls towards
the centre of the earth (Comte 1957: 239). Since the human world is
more complicated, freedom is to be achieved by special effort, for
there are more chances of disturbance.19
Comte, like Locke (cf Two treatises of government II, vi, 7), associates
law immediately with freedom. There is a difference, however. In
Locke the “law of nature” gives (rational) direction, while in Comte
freedom is identified with law in terms of a conception which tends
to make the subrational prevail. Comte relinquishes the openness
which his insight into the complexity of human phenomena allowed
him, by seeing this only in terms of possible “perturbations”, instead
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19 “Thus the veritable liberty is found especially inherent and subordinated to the
order, as much human as exterior. But to the measure that the phenomena are
more complicated, they would become more susceptible of perturbation, and
the normal state there supposes more efforts, as on the other hand it permits
here a greater aptitude for systematic modifications.  Our better liberty consists
therefore in making, as much as possible, the good penchants prevail over the
bad ones; it is also there that our empire is the most expanded, on condition
that our intervention there always conforms to the fundamental laws of the
universal order” (Comte 1957: 240).
of as space for the free play of positive creativity. Comte’s idea of law
was probably adopted from the sphere of “physical laws” (he viewed
physics as the starting point of the positivising of knowledge), for-
getting that “law” was originally a metaphor taken from the sphere
of human freedom. It is significant that Comte no longer found it ne-
cessary to distinguish clearly between types of natural law as Quesnay
did; law and natural law are synonymous for him.
4.4 Hierarchy and unity
It was noted above that the mature Comte aimed at unifying human
life and society from a subjective perspective — a unification of the
physical with the moral via the intellectual. In the eighteenth centu-
ry (for example in Hume) the sentiments (the “organ” for everyday
moral life) were considered as subrational, albeit reason’s closest ally.
Comte inverted this relationship and elevated the sentiments above
the intellect by elevating the moral above the intellectual and main-
taining the close association between the moral and the sentiments.
The subordination and unification was obtained by virtue of the or-
der of complexity among the laws, as well as the way in which the
intellectual laws function in the hierarchy of complexity.
Comte’s hierarchy rests upon the idea of a vast variety of pheno-
mena, organised under a multiplicity of mutually irreducible laws —
the unity of the hierarchy is therefore subjectively constructed. The
first irreducible multiplicity is the dualism of the (subhuman) world
and man. But each of the two represents in itself a variety of pheno-
mena, which are subsumed under different and mutually irreducible
kinds of law:
[...] to explain [...] the systematic coherence of the whole positive
dogma about such unity [...] you must from the start reject every
absolute, external, in a word, objective, unity [...] Such a wish, com-
patible with the study of causes, becomes contradictory in relation
to the study of laws, that is to say of the constant relations under-
stood within the context of an immense diversity. These latter allow
for only a purely relative unity, a human one, in a word: subjective
one. In fact these laws are necessarily multiple, in accordance with
the notorious impossibility of ever reducing one of the two general
elements of all our real conceptions, the world and man, to the
other. [...] Although the world supposes man to be known, it could
exist without man [...] In the same way, humankind depends upon
the world, but it [humankind] does not result from it [the world].
40
Acta Academica 2002: 34(1)
All the efforts of materialists to annihilate the spontaneity of life by
exaggerating the preponderance of inert environments over organi-
sed beings, has only succeeded in discrediting this research, just as
vain as it is idle, from now on left to anti-scientific minds (Comte
1957: 167-8).
Comte accepts the world as it presents itself in its variety. This is
what “scientific” means to him — reductionism would probably im-
ply something like a causal explanation or spelling out the “why?”,
which he rejects. He ascribes some coherence to the variety due to their
subsumption under particular kinds of law, but since the world of law
is conceived of as also a variety (albeit a smaller one), he has no option
but to accept the quasi-Kantian solution of unity as a construct. The
metaphysical unity found in the simplicity of the transcendent God in
Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas is reconstructed by Comte in a sub-
jective sense. But in his analysis of the different kinds of law, he did
not consistently refrain from writing as if there is some kind of objec-
tive coherence, as our discussion of the combination of the law of clas-
sification with the law of filiation will show.
Comte’s own summary (1957: 193) of the hierarchy is given un-
der the title: “Theoretical hierarchy of human conceptions or syn-
thetic table of the universal order, according to an encyclopaedic lad-
der in five or seven steps”. The summary is encompassing, for Comte
adds a subtitle: “Positive philosophy or systematic knowledge of hu-
manity”. The title and subtitle indicate what Comte intended the
summary to present: the whole of his philosophy, but specifically (i)
his view of the encyclopaedia of the sciences simultaneously with (ii)
the way in which the total conceptual structure of knowledge is con-
ceived, as well as (iii) a synthesis of the whole universal order. Com-
te thus slipped over from the constructivist (subjectivist) approach
(ii) to an objectivist position (iii). It has been noted above that he
viewed the universal order as independent.
In a “dogmatic” sense Comte divided the sciences into two
groups: the study of the earth, or cosmology, and the study of man,
or sociology. Cosmology is further divided into (i) abstract cosmolo-
gy, or the fundamental study of universal existence, ie mathematics,
and (ii) initially numerical, then geometrical, and finally mechanical
cosmology, (physics, which is further subdivided into celestial phy-
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sics, or astronomy, and terrestrial physics, consisting of general or
proper physics and special physics or chemistry). Sociology is divided
into (i) the preliminary or general study of the vital order, ie biology,
and (ii) the direct study of the human order, which is subdivided into
collective sociology (sociology proper) and individual sociology (mo-
rals). In all there are seven sciences: mathematics, astronomy, physics,
chemistry, biology, sociology, and morals.
In an “historical” sense the first four are called “preliminary scien-
ces” (those which historically first became positive but only found
their meaning in terms of the human-centred teleology focused in
the later sciences) or “natural philosophy”; they have as object the ex-
terior order. The other three are historically characterised as “final
sciences” (“final” here may be read as indicating both “later”and
“goal”) or “moral philosophy”; they have as object the human order.
(It should be noted that in this exceptional case “natural” refers to the
subhuman order).
The principles of construction of the hierarchy are non-reducibility,
simplicity versus complexity, and the general versus the particular:
Although every class of phenomena always has its proper laws,
which suppose special inductions, these latter [inductions] would
nearly never be able to become effective without the deductions fur-
nished by the preceding knowledge of simpler laws. This subjective
subordination results from the objective dependence of less general
phenomena with reference to those that are more general. Thus the
continuous order of our studies, always ascending from the world to
man, is not only motivated according to the logical preparation that
the simpler speculations allow; it rests also upon the scientific de-
pendence of superior theories on inferior ones, according to the sub-
ordination of the respective phenomena (Comte 1957: 181).
Comte’s condensed remarks here imply firstly that every science
concerns a set of phenomena which has its own set of irreducible
laws, and that knowledge of the higher sets of these laws presupposes
two methodological approaches: (i) a set of deductions derived from
knowledge of lower sets of laws, and (ii) a set of inductions derived
from the study of the proper phenomena of a particular science.
Knowledge of the higher laws is therefore methodologically subordi-
nate to knowledge of the lower laws, in spite of their mutual irredu-
cibility. Secondly, the position of a science in the hierarchy (and im-
plicitly also of a class of phenomena) is determined by complexity
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and generality: the simpler laws are more general (the simplest laws,
those of mathematics, should therefore apply to all phenomena), and
the more complex ones are more particular (thus the most complex
laws, those of morals, apply only to a very particular set of phenome-
na). Again Comte (1957: 185) goes back to the objective sphere: the
phenomena are connected with things, and “the phenomena are only
more general in as far as they belong to a larger number of exis-
tences”. In other words, the measure of extension of phenomena (and
their laws) over things qualifies the things as of this or that kind. The
dogma of humanity thus provides the transcending movement which
gives meaning to the knowledge of the simpler phenomena and
therefore limits them to the interest of human exploitation of the
planet; on the other hand, the sciences of complexity historically pre-
suppose that the sciences of simplicity be positive before the higher
sciences can succeed.
4.5 The intellectual laws
Surprisingly, the study of the intellect and its laws, the mediating
knowledge in the process of the theoretical unification of the superior
sciences with the inferior (the moral with the physical) is not included
in the summary. In the order of dependence the moral laws have their
foundation in the intellectual ones (as sentiment ought to be founded
on the intellect), and the intellectual laws have their foundation in the
physical ones. These three types of law correspond with the Saint-
Simonian distinction of physiological types of people: the cerebral
type (scientists searching for positive laws), the sentimental type (ar-
tists and moralists working against egoism), and the mobile type (ac-
tive people working and administering). But the mature Comte gave
moral sentiment a more important role, correlating the three levels
with gender differences instead of with types of people: the senti-
ments are more developed in women, therefore they did most for the
development of morality; activity is more developed in men, thus they
contributed most to a firm basis for the utilitarian functions, and the
intellectual world is the proper field of the priesthood of the religion
of humanity. Until the arrival of positivism, says Comte, the two gen-
ders followed empirical rules, with limited success. The physical order
provided men with firm convictions, but without the coherent per-
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spective which discloses the physical activity in terms of its moral des-
tination, while the (feminine) moral order lacked the firm base of in-
tellectual physics (physiology?), and amounted to no more than refi-
ned affection. But the proposed unity in terms of the positive dogma
provides a different avenue:
A sound theoretical culture ought therefore to surge from the phy-
sical order, by selecting from it enough active specialties. But as the
necessary end of our real meditations resides in the moral order, the
logical and scientific unity can only be established according to a
sufficient union of these two extreme domains. But they can only be
united through the intermediary domain, which is naturally united
to each of them. It is for this reason that the construction of a true
theoretical unity depends finally upon a sufficient elaboration of the
laws proper to the understanding (Comte 1957: 169-70).
As with all laws, the intellectual laws are distinguished as static
or dynamic “following their reference either to immovable disposi-
tions or to essential variations of the corresponding object” and —
importantly — “with reference to any domain whatsoever, the study
of the static necessarily precedes the study of the dynamic” (Comte
1957: 171-2). The reason why the static has to precede the dynamic,
as shall be demonstrated, is that the dynamic functions within the
structural framework set by the static. In other words, Comte’s idea
of history is a structural one — his idea of progress is related to that
of Turgot in the sense that it can only follow a fixed pattern in all
communities. The fixed pattern of three phases which Comte inheri-
ted from Turgot is founded in a static law, and those who limit the
discussion of law in Comte to the law of phases (eg Botha 1993: 45ff)
are honouring him with too much dynamics. The intellect is bound
to a necessary sequence in its development.
The static law of the understanding “consists [...] in the continu-
ous subordination of our subjective constructions to our objective
materials”, which is “a simple application of the fundamental prin-
ciple that subordinates man to world, everywhere” (Comte 1957:
172). Comte here refers to Aristotle’s adagium that there is nothing
in the intellect which has not first been in the senses, but hastens to
add that Leibnitz and, in particular, Kant also drew attention to the
converse: that the intellect is not passive and that every human con-
ception therefore has a subjective and an objective side. Comte’s po-
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sitivism diminishes Kant’s subjectivism by stressing the general law
of the dependence of every organism upon its milieu — the external
world serves as food, stimulator and regulator both for the body and
for the higher spiritual functions. The external world rules the inter-
nal in terms of the complementary law that “in the normal state, the
subjective images are always less lively and less precise than the ob-
jective impressions from which they emanate” (Comte 1957: 173).
Two aspects of this law are important: (i) it has been seen above that
from a utilitarian point of view we need not be one hundred percent
precise, and (ii) the lack of precision leaves avenues open for theore-
tical speculation, but also for correction from the objective side till
our heads become trustworthy mirrors of the outside world (Comte
1957: 173-4). The scope for theoretical speculation provides the ba-
sis from which the dynamic law can operate. The intellectual prin-
ciple which makes evolution possible resides in the static law which
“forces us to draw from ourselves the subjective connections of our
objective impressions” (Comte 1957: 177). The Kantian side of
Comte’s epistemology shows itself in that the coherence of the im-
pressions is supposed to be constructed subjectively. By means of the
static law, however, Comte provides a priori for a structure of pro-
gress, called “the dynamic law”.
As in Turgot, so in Comte, the progress of humankind is a mental
one, which finds expression in the dynamic law of the intellect,
known as the law of the three phases. This “consists in the necessary
passage of every theoretical conception through three successive pha-
ses: the first, the theological or fictitious; the second, the metaphysi-
cal or abstract; the third, the positive or real” (Comte 1957: 176).
The succession of phases is the product of the subjective construction
of coherence among the impressions, governed by the static law. The
true relations among things can only be comprehended after a long
and gradual analysis, therefore the first hypotheses about coherence
are purely spontaneous (and thus fictitious), explaining phenomena
by means of superhuman wills — an excess of subjectivity brought
about by the immature mental situation. This is a necessary phase,
however, since progress requires an initiative such as this in order to
modify the world according to our will, which is the motive for our
intellectual efforts (Comte 1957: 177-8). And theological thinking
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conforms very well to the single rule to which, for Comte, all sound
logic is reducible: “to form always the simplest hypothesis compa-
tible with the collection of attained information” (Comte 1957:
178). The second phase, the metaphysical, differs from the initial on-
ly in that it reduces the primitive divinities to simple entities —
both phases provide causal explanations. But the consistency which
the theological supernatural had in the social and mental spheres is
lost by the metaphysical abstractions; this implies that metaphysics
is no more than a pure “dissolvent” of theology — it is transitory
(Comte 1957: 176-7). The last phase differs from the first two “by its
characteristic substitution of the relative for the absolute, when the
study of laws in the end replaces the search for causes” (Comte 1957:
176). Positivism, in its search for laws, sails between the Scylla of
mysticism (searching for causes) and the Charybdis of empiricism
(restricting itself to the facts) (Comte 1957: 174).
Comte explains the phenomenon that one and the same human
intellect can, according to the questions which occupy it, simultane-
ously be theological, metaphysical and positive, by referring to the
constant order which governs the flow of different conceptions, in
terms of a complementary law: “as more general phenomena are ne-
cessarily simpler, the corresponding speculations must be easier and
present [...] a more rapid ascent” (Comte 1957: 180). This means
that theories in the fields of simpler phenomena become positive be-
fore those relating to more complex fields of study. Comte calls this
the “law of classification”, and it is especially subjective in the sense
that it governs the order of studies, which properly moves from the
world to man, providing both a logical preparation and a firm base
for the superior theories, which depend on the inferior ones, just as
the more complex phenomena depend on the simpler ones. But the
law of classification directly implies an objective “signification” or
law, with an especially static destination. This latter law does not go-
vern the flow of subjective constructions, but rather applies to the
fundamental order that dominates the collection of all events what-
soever, ruling “the general dependence of the diverse phenomena”
(Comte 1957: 182). In this way Comte, in spite of his insistence that
the unity is a relative and subjective one, still lapsed dialectically in-
to the acceptance of an objective coherence of dependence, of events
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of different kinds. In fact the name of this law, the “law of filiation”,
itself indicates coherence.
We can conclude, therefore, that even though Comte believed
that coherence (or “unity”, as he called it), is strictly subjective and
relative, he did allow a kind of orderly coherence permit: in the law
of filiation we find an objective coherence of phenomena — a cohe-
rence of dependence of the more complex on the simpler. The subjec-
tive coherence in the law of classification mirrors the objective cohe-
rence, and all the other laws presented by Comte indicate types of co-
herence. The dependence of superior phenomena upon inferior ones
implies the dependence of humankind upon the world.
To draw the distinct lines of our discussion of Comte together:
Comte tends, like Turgot, to allow physical necessity to prevail. The
order of complexity, which parallels the order of dependence (the
more complex being dependent on the simpler), implies also that the
sciences of simpler phenomena take a methodological precedence
over those of more complex phenomena, and this means that the me-
thods of the natural sciences form the basis for those of the human
sciences. But the prevalence of the physical and the methods of the
natural sciences are tempered by two considerations: firstly that of
the mutual irreducibility of the different kinds of law and the pheno-
mena for which each set of laws is valid, and secondly that of the
human order which is teleological and which is supposed to disclose
meaning to the subhuman order. The idea of the practical or techni-
cal advantage of the human being — found already in Descartes, the
capitalist economists, and the physiocrat Quesnay — is part of this
teleological meaning.
The deification of humanity — a re-invention of the transcendent
in the immanent, as is clear from the fact that Comte (1957: 178-9)
rejected both pantheism and atheism, as well as the “supernatural” —
is here based on a universal order conforming to irreducible laws
which stabilise this order. In other words, Comte abolishes the law-
giver God at the price of absolutising law itself. The “natural order”
is the order, and freedom is nothing but conformity with law. “Law”
is “law” — the debate on the meaning of “natural law” is actually ir-
relevant in discussing Comte. Or, stated differently: Comte’s rejection
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of the “supernatural” has left only “nature”, but with an expanded
meaning — all of reality is “nature” and subject to “natural law”.
A distinct feature of Comte’s conception is his definition of law as
“the constant relations of succession and similitude” of “observable
phenomena”. This conception is a product of the positivist (anti-
metaphysical) attitude of Comte: the relations are by virtue of the de-
finition rather “statistical” and “Humean” — Comte apparently
avoids analysing these relations in terms of categories such as those
of Kant or the causal thinking of a strictly deterministic Einstein (cf
Venter 1999b: 169ff). Comte’s conception of law has the advantage,
however, of offering the scope to include different kinds of law — ie
to discuss even non-causal universal relationships in terms of varie-
ties of law.
5. Conclusion
In modern times (following medieval suggestions), the metaphor of
“law” in the sense of a cosmic order was specifically associated with
rationality as the natural faculty of logical understanding. This was
the case with the older meaning of natural law as the norm for human
behaviour, as well as the later Cartesian view of natural law as an
axiom for the understanding of mechanical nature. Whereas in the
Middle Ages natural law served as a rationalisation for state interven-
tion in all kinds of civil life (such as economic life), in modern times
it became a rationalisation of the freedom of the individual to pursue
self-interest, while intervention was seen as interference with the di-
vinely established cosmic order (cf Willey 1962: 16-7). Thus two
meanings of the metaphorical use of “natural law” emerged. Some-
what oversimplified, they can be distinguished as (i) the Cartesian:
the inevitable regularities of the mechanical order, and (ii) the Locke-
an: the rational norm for living a life of freedom and respect for the
rights of others. Ironically, in the tradition of humanism, especially
positivism, the early modern association of freedom with “natural
law” was progressively eroded until, in Comte, the world as environ-
ment became completely dominant, and those who did not follow
Comte’s suggestion of a religion of humanity, finally denied all hu-
man initiative (for example behaviourism and orthodox Marxism).
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Will man live by bread alone? This indeed is what the physiocrats
suggested. Quesnay focused on the two meanings, distinguishing na-
tural laws as either physical or moral. Physical laws were regulated
courses of physical events which are evidently the most advantageous
to humankind, while moral laws were norms conforming to those
physical laws. With a formulation like this, Quesnay introduced a
one-sided relation of dependency on (subhuman) nature — morality
being associated with the physically advantageous. But he also intro-
duced a relationship of enmity: humankind is interested in nature in-
sofar as it is advantageous for itself — it does not matter that its ad-
vantages may conflict with the interests of other sectors of creation.
Quesnay plays a dialectical game between two extremes: on the one
hand the normative freedom (rights) of humankind, and on the other
the physical basis — but reduced to the advantageous (probably un-
derstood as that which promotes agriculture). Ironically one can still
interpret “advantageous” in various ways — for all his accentuation
of rights and free market principles, Quesnay remained near Bodin in
his promotion of princely government. Positively Quesnay saw that
within the cosmic order there are limitations to what human beings
can aspire to — thus he criticises the bad use of freedom. But on the
negative side he understands natural (physical) law only in terms of
human self-centredness. Quesnay still refers to a higher authority be-
hind natural law — a divine lawgiver. But he does not seem to have
the same sense of divine presence which one finds associated for in-
stance with Newton’s idea of law (cf Van der Hoeven 1979: 85-90).
His view of the world is centred in humankind, but at the same time
even his (self-centred) view of morality has a physicalist strain to it.
In time the two extremes would be pulled further apart: humanity
itself becomes a divinity which either creates the order as an end in
itself (Kant, Sartre), or serves as the final cause of nature (Comte). Or
the emphasis could fall on bread production (Marx) and the physical
conditions for its production — humankind as the product of the
natural environment (Turgot, Watson and Skinner).
Drawing a clear distinction between the human and the natural
spheres did not prevent Turgot from one-sidedly introducing the
analogy of a causal relationship into the study of human history. The
influence of the mechanism of self-interest, working through the pas-
49
Venter/‘Nature’, ‘law’, ‘humanity’
sions (by analogy with growth into maturity) in the direction of a
peaceful equilibrium, emerges very clearly in Turgot’s early works.
This approach, which had its precursor in Hobbes’s “war of all
against all” and the mercantilist view of the inevitable natural law of
the price mechanism, is determinist in the sense that human compe-
titive freedom (at least in aggregate) takes the human being with it
like a dog on a leash. Thus human history follows a pattern regulated
by laws, of which the law of the three phases of intellectual progress
became the most influential. Human social relationships are esta-
blished by the mode of bread production, by physical necessity, to be
studied according to the quantitative methods of natural science.
Turgot believed in a superstructure of necessary mental progress,
based finally upon the foundations of production according to pat-
terns of physical necessity, and thus became the precursor of Comte
and Marx. In Turgot, humankind is progressively “naturalised” and
the divine lawgiver disappears into a vague “providence”. But he did
still allow for an individual structure of human history on the basis
of the creative passions and rational freedom, as humankind matures.
However, as the sense of normative responsibility towards a higher
authority declines, evils (such as greed, selfishness, and the ambition
to control others), become simply part of the mechanism of progress.
Comte summarised his own mature philosophy in one sentence:
“Love as a principle; Order as base; Progress as goal”. Although indi-
cated as “goal”, progress is not a normative ideal towards which we
may or may not strive: it is the inevitable development of the intel-
lect regulated by the static law, which enforces the order of succession
expressed in the dynamic law of three phases. The intellect has no
free initiative in its development. Thus the system of Comte is one
of law and order, expanded into the human field — he undeniably
approached the human sciences after the pattern of the (physical) na-
tural sciences. Comte, however, realised what Skinner may have for-
gotten: that a life lived under the inevitability of natural law may not
be a life worth living — that it is love, rather, which makes life mea-
ningful. Comte was also concerned about the self-centredness of the
passions and would not as easily accept that such passions would ne-
cessarily contribute to progress. Thus he insists on the non-
reducibility of the human to the subhuman, and on the disclosing
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function of the love for the divine — a divine which he had to invent
(in the form of humanity).
In the mature Comte modern humanism finds full expression: hu-
mankind matures by relinquishing the divine and thus finds itself
completely as part of nature and its laws; but since life has no mean-
ing outside the principle of love, Comte is obliged to introduce a
transcendent into the immanent in the form of humanity as the di-
vine object of love. Still believing (like Quesnay) that knowledge of
the laws is intended for exploitation and control, Comte is afraid of
the consequences of this for humankind (given its basis in selfish pas-
sions), but believes that the expansion of a law approach to the hu-
man sciences reveals a divinity which can serve (in the absence of a
cosmic creator and lawgiver) as a “final cause”: humanity itself. He
then still has to put his trust in the law-abiding behaviour of the best
instincts (those that function altruistically), and elevate the moral
sentiments to the highest function in man. In the mature Comte, ra-
tionality begins to lose its standing as the midway between subjecti-
vism (madness and mysticism) and objectivism (idiocy and empiri-
cism). A valuable aspect to Comte’s thinking is his defence of the
non-reducibility of the human functions (the moral, social and intel-
lectual) to the physical aspects, and the potential for cultural disclo-
sure of the various law-spheres through love.
In modernity (Kant, for example) rationality had a double func-
tion: on the one hand it is the product of nature and the goal of na-
ture’s historical movement; on the other it is a goal in itself, and ele-
vated above history, yet guiding history in its progress. The dethro-
ning of rationality, which started very subtly in the mature Comte,
is ironically also the dethroning of human dignity (for human digni-
ty historically meant nothing more than the possession of rationality;
cf Venter 2000a) and an ironical “guilt by association” in the human
subject itself. The consequences of this we can find in Skinner’s
thinking. And in irrationalist pragmatism Comte’s practical and te-
leological approach to natural law is taken to the extreme of the end
justifying the means. But the collapse of the rational subject of pro-
gressive history is also to be seen in other, reactionary, forms of
present-day thinking, such as Foucault’s replacement of origins-
investigation (the state of nature) with an endless genealogy of fact-
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ual power relationships (Foucault 1984: 76ff), apparently without
being able to take a normative stance in relation to the positivist
“narrative of mastery” (cf Owens 1987: 57).
This at least clears the agenda for a new look at concepts such as
“nature”, “rationality”, “order”, “law”, “norm”, “subjectivity” and
“freedom”. The attempts of Dilthey and Husserl to promote special
methods for the human sciences and the growth of qualitative re-
search did not prevent positivism, pragmatism, and technicism from
exerting a strong grip on the study of human beings. Later positi-
vism did not accept Comte’s reintroduction of religion and dualism:
in scientism’s (and the accompanying technicism’s) view of human-
kind nothing especially “human” and untouchable remains: ques-
tions of normativity, subjectivity, and human dignity are marginali-
sed in a reductionist, engineering approach to the study of human-
kind. This kind of study is not limited to proposals in journals and
books; science now changes its object of study with the intention of
remaking it.
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